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Abstract. We propose a new Quantum Key Recycling (QKR) protocol, which 
recycles used keys according to the error rate. Our QKR protocol can tolerate 
the noise in the quantum channel. The earlier studies [1-4] also proposed QKR 
protocols with noise tolerance. Unfortunately, there is a common security loop-
hole in these protocols. Our QKR protocol is designed to avoid this security 
loophole, and the key recycling rate of the pre-shared keys is optimized depend-
ing on the noise level. The security proof shows the security of the recycled 
keys is universal composable. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
An important issue in quantum cryptography is key recycling. Taking One-time Pad 
(OTP) in classical cryptography as an example, if a sender Alice uses 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 to encrypt a 
message 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖  (i.e., 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖⨁𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) and sends the ciphertext 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖  to the receiver Bob, can 
Alice recycle the used  𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 in the subsequent communications? Obviously, the used 
key cannot be recycled securely if an adversary, Eve, owns a copy of the ciphertext 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 
and the message 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 pair (Eve can do known-plaintext attack in this situation). But if 
the cipher is encoded into the quantum state, it is possible to recycle the used key 
securely, even if Eve has unlimited computation power. This is because a quantum 
cipher can detect the existence of eavesdropping by using the quantum uncertainty 
principle.  
Quantum Key Recycling (QKR) is first proposed in 1982 [5]. In a QKR protocol, 
Alice and Bob pre-share some keys firstly, Alice uses the pre-shared keys to encrypt 
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the message and the Message Authentication Code (MAC) of that message, and then 
encode the cipher into quantum states. If Eve wants to get the information about the 
cipher, she will disturb the quantum states and affect the MAC. After Bob receives 
the qubits, he can decode the cipher and check the MAC. If the check passes, he can 
ensure that this communication is not eavesdropped by Eve, i.e., the cipher is not 
intercepted or copied by Eve. Because the cipher has not been known by Eve, the 
used keys can be recycled even the keys are used to produce quantum OTP. The stud-
ies [1, 6] proved that this idea is secure and the recycled keys have composable secu-
rity.  
The study [1] also indicates a new question: how to add the noise-tolerance proper-
ty to the QKR protocol? The above-mentioned QKR protocols can only transmit the 
message via an ideal (noiseless) channel because the integrity of MAC will be broken 
and then the protocol will fail if any qubit is disturbed by the channel’s noise. Since 
the assumption of the noiseless channel is not practical, this issue influences the fea-
sibility of the QKR protocols in practical applications. [1] provided a solution to this 
question, but it can only tolerate a few noise errors. Therefore, other studies [2-4] 
tried to increase the noise-tolerance level by adding Error Correcting Code (ECC) 
such as an RS code [7] or LDPC code [8]. After Bob receives the qubits and obtains 
the cipher, he will use the ECC to correct the noise errors first and then check the 
MAC. 
However, in this study, we would like to disclose that the studies [1-4] have a 
common security loophole, in which Eve’s attacking traces could also be erased by 
ECC1. More specifically speaking, these studies [1-4] only focused on noise tolerance 
(i.e., correcting noise errors), but they ignored that these errors may be created by 
Eve’s attacks. If Eve wants to get information in the quantum state, she will disturb 
the quantum state and cause errors. The errors causing by Eve’s attack and the errors 
from the environment noise cannot be distinguished. If Eve only attacks a few qubits 
so that the introduced errors can be corrected by the ECC, then their protocol will 
correct the errors and Eve can steal information without being detected.  
We take [2] as an example to explain this security loophole. Here, assuming the 
protocol mentioned in [2] can tolerate 𝑥𝑥% of the errors of the message and Eve can 
use the known-plaintext attack. When the sender, Alice, sends the quantum ciphertext 
to the receiver, Bob, Eve intercepts all qubits, attacks 𝑥𝑥% qubits (here, she can adopt 
any attack strategy to obtain the classical information about the ciphertext), and then 
sends all qubits (including attacked and non-attacked qubits) to Bob by using the 
noiseless quantum channel. Because Eve attacks 𝑥𝑥%  qubits, some errors will be 
caused. However, because these errors will be less than or equal to 𝑥𝑥%, Bob eventual-
ly will correct the errors (i.e., Eve’s attack traces could be eliminated), and thus Bob 
cannot detect Eve’s attack. The error correction under this situation will make all the 
keys used to encrypt the message in this round to be recycled and reused in the next 
                                                        
1  A QKR-like protocol called unclonable encryption [9] doesn’t have this security 
loophole. It always abandons some keys to erase the information leaked to Eve. 
This makes the unclonable encryption protocol unable to recycle all the keys even 
when there is no error. 
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round. Meanwhile, Eve can obtain some information about these recycled keys by 
using that part of classical cipher and the known-plaintext attack. After a finite num-
ber of rounds, Eve could eventually be able to obtain enough information about the 
recycled keys and steal all secure messages that Alice sends to Bob. According to the 
above-mentioned attack strategy, all the QKR protocols adopting the same method to 
tolerate the noise of the quantum channel also have this security loophole. 
1.2 Contributions 
In this paper, we propose a new QKR protocol for the noisy quantum channels with-
out the above-mentioned security loophole. The core idea of our research is to take 
the number of errors that are corrected by ECC into account when recycling keys. Our 
QKR protocol only uses single qubits with conjugate coding and doesn’t need any 
classical communication. We eliminate the classical channel by delaying recycling 
some of the keys (these keys are recycled in the next round of the protocol). We also 
give a security analysis of the recycled keys and optimize the key recycling rate (the 
length of the recycled keys / the length of all the keys used to run the protocol in a 
round). Our QKR protocol can recycle all the keys when no error exists and can recy-
cle keys safely and efficiently if the error rate is under a specific level. 
The security of the recycled keys is analyzed based on information theory. The se-
curity of the recycled keys in our QKR protocol is universal composable [10]. The 
distance between the recycled keys and the ideal keys is limited by a specific security 
parameter 𝜀𝜀. This means that an adversary only has an 𝜀𝜀 chance to distinguish the 
difference between our QKR protocol and an ideal one.   
2 Preliminaries 
Most of the notations will be explained when they first appear in this paper, but we 
describe a few notations here for convenience: the notation |𝑋𝑋| denotes the number of 
possible values of a variable 𝑋𝑋 and we define |𝑋𝑋|𝑙𝑙 = log2|𝑋𝑋|.  
2.1 Information entropy 
The concept of information entropy is introduced by Shannon in 1948 [11]. It gives a 
way to measure the randomness of a message. We denote the information entropy of a 
random variable 𝑋𝑋 in bits by 
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) = −∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) log2 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥)𝑥𝑥  , 
where 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is the probability of possible values 𝑥𝑥. 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) achieves the maximum when 
all possible values of 𝑋𝑋 have the uniform probability and will be 0 when the value of 
𝑋𝑋 is definite. This entropy is also called the “Shannon entropy”. The meaning of the 
Shannon entropy of a random variable 𝑋𝑋 is the uncertainty of the variable 𝑋𝑋.  
We denote the conditional entropy of a random variable 𝑋𝑋 when given another var-
iable 𝑌𝑌 by 
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𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) = −∑ 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) log2 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥 ,𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦)𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦  . 
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) = 0 if and only if the variable 𝑋𝑋 is completely determined by 𝑌𝑌. Conversely, 
𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) =  𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) if and only if 𝑋𝑋 is completely independent of 𝑌𝑌. 
Using the definition above, we can denote the mutual information of two variables 
𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 by  
𝐼𝐼(𝑋𝑋;𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋) − 𝐻𝐻(𝑋𝑋|𝑌𝑌) = 𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌) −𝐻𝐻(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) . 
The meaning of mutual information is the uncertainty of a variable when the other 
variable is known. It is the opposite of conditional entropy. When two variables are 
completely independent, the mutual information will be 0. And the mutual infor-
mation will achieve maximum when one variable can completely determine the other 
one. 
2.2 The density operator and the von Neumann entropy 
We denote the density operator of a quantum state 𝑄𝑄 = |𝜓𝜓⟩ as 𝜌𝜌𝑄𝑄 = |𝜓𝜓⟩⟨𝜓𝜓|. We can 
use the density operator of the quantum state 𝑄𝑄 to calculate the von Neumann entropy 
of 𝑄𝑄. The von Neumann entropy is very similar to the Shannon entropy. They both are 
used to measure uncertainty. But the von Neumann entropy is used to measure the 
uncertainty of a quantum state instead of a variable. We denote the von Neumann 
entropy of a quantum state 𝑄𝑄 by 
𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄) = −tr(𝜌𝜌𝑄𝑄 log2 𝜌𝜌𝑄𝑄) , 
where tr denotes trace. And if we write 𝜌𝜌𝑄𝑄 in terms of its eigenvectors |1⟩, … , |𝑗𝑗⟩ as 
𝜌𝜌𝑄𝑄 = ∑ ŋ𝑗𝑗|𝑗𝑗⟩𝑗𝑗 ⟨𝑗𝑗|, then the von Neumann entropy is [12] 
𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄) = −∑ ŋ𝑗𝑗 log2 ŋ𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  . 
It is worth mentioning that the von Neumann entropy is not used to measure the 
measurement uncertainty of a quantum state but is used to measure the uncertainty of 
a mixed state. The von Neumann entropy is not affected by the measurement opera-
tors (or called measurement basis) used to measure the state. For example: If we use 
the z-basis to measure the quantum state |+⟩ = 1/√2(|0⟩ + |1⟩), the measurement 
result is random. But the von Neumann entropy of |+⟩ is 0 because it is a pure state. 
Just like the Shannon entropy, we can denote the conditional entropy and mutual 
information of the von Neumann entropy in a similar way. The meanings of them are 
also similar except the von Neumann entropy is used to measure the uncertainty of a 
quantum state. 
2.3 Universal composable security 
The universal composable security of a component (a system, a protocol, or a key) is 
defined as a real component close to an ideal (secure) one. We can say, for example, a 
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key 𝑆𝑆 is ε-secure with respect to an ideal key 𝐾𝐾, which is independent and uniformly 
distributed, if the distance between 𝑆𝑆 and 𝐾𝐾 is less than or equal to ε, where ε is a 
chosen secure parameter that ε ≥ 0. 
We denote the trace distance between density operators of two quantum states 𝜌𝜌 
and 𝜎𝜎 by 
𝛿𝛿(𝜌𝜌, 𝜎𝜎) = 1
2
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡(|𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎|) = 1
2
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡��(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎)†(𝜌𝜌 − 𝜎𝜎)� . 
We can say 𝜌𝜌 is ε-close to σ if 𝛿𝛿(𝜌𝜌, 𝜎𝜎) ≤ ε. The distance between classical variables 
can be seen as a special case of the trace distance. Let 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 be two random varia-
bles. The variational distance between the probability distribution of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌 is de-
noted by 
𝛿𝛿(𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋 ,𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌) = 12 ∑ |𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋(𝑖𝑖),𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌(𝑖𝑖)|𝑖𝑖  , 
where 𝑖𝑖 is the possible value of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌. The variational distance is equal to the trace 
distance 𝛿𝛿([|𝑋𝑋|], [|𝑌𝑌|]), where [|𝑋𝑋|] and [|𝑌𝑌|] are the state representations of 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌, 
i.e., 
𝛿𝛿(𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋 ,𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌) = 𝛿𝛿([|𝑋𝑋|], [|𝑌𝑌|]) . 
The universal composable security provides many good properties. First, a key that 
has universal composable security can maintain its security in any context. If a secret 
key S has universal composable security, the remaining bits in S are secure even some 
bits of S are given to an adversary. Second, the security of a complex system can be 
calculated more easily by simply summing the secure parameters ε of its components. 
We can do this because the trace distance is subadditive with respect to the tensor 
product. Third, there are no quantum operators that can increase the trace distance of 
two quantum states by applying the same operator to them. 
2.4 Privacy amplification 
Let’s say that there is a string held by two participants called Alice and Bob, and they 
want to use it as their secret key. But some information about this string is held by an 
adversary called Eve, and Alice and Bob only know how many bits have been leaked, 
though they don’t know which ones are leaked. Then, is it possible to use part of this 
string as a secret key? The answer is affirmative. We can use the privacy amplification 
to extract a shorter secret key from an insecure string by erasing the information held 
by Eve. The extracted secret key can have universal composable security and be ε-
secure with respect to an ideal key, where ε is the secure parameter chosen by Alice 
and Bob. 
Let 𝑆𝑆 denote the insecure string and ℱ denote a family of hash functions. The func-
tion ℱ  from domain 𝒳𝒳  to range 𝒴𝒴  is said to be two-universal [13, 14] if Pr𝑓𝑓←𝑃𝑃ℱ [𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥′)] ≤ 1|𝒴𝒴|, for any 𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥′ ∈ 𝒳𝒳. The research [10] of the properties of 
the two-universal hash function shows we can use it to do privacy amplification. The 
length of the secret key that can be extracted from the insecure string is limited by the 
information about the string held by Eve. We can bound the key extracted rate (the 
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length of secret key extracted from an insecure string divided by the length of the 
string) by [15, 16] 
 key extracted rate ≥ 𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴|𝐸𝐸) − 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) (1) 
  = 𝐼𝐼(𝐴𝐴;𝐵𝐵) − 𝐼𝐼(𝐴𝐴;𝐸𝐸) ,  (2) 
where 𝐸𝐸 is the quantum information of the string held by Eve and 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 are the 
string held by Alice and Bob.  
In this paper, we use privacy amplification to extract a secret key from a used key. 
We then call the key extracted rate key recycling rate.  
3 The protocol 
Before Alice sends a message 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝑛 to Bob. Alice and Bob need to share a 
secret key pool 𝐾𝐾 which they can pick up secret keys from it synchronously. They 
also share an authentication function 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(), an error correction function 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑() and a 
key updating function 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈() defined below.  
Definition 1 [17]. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴() is an ε-almost XOR 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝜀𝜀-𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈2) hash function. The 
𝜀𝜀-𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋𝑈𝑈2 hash function is a family of hash functions 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 for 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 ∈{0,1}𝑡𝑡 that if 𝐴𝐴 is a random key and for all 𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 that 𝑚𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚𝑚2 and all 𝑡𝑡 ∈
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸, 
𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝑢𝑢
[𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚1) ⊕𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚2) = 𝑡𝑡] ≤ 𝜀𝜀 , 
where 𝜀𝜀 is a secure parameter. 
Definition 2. The error correction function ECCd(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) = 𝐸𝐸  for 𝐸𝐸 ∈ {0,1}𝑛𝑛+𝑠𝑠  can 
encode a message 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 into a binary linear code 𝐸𝐸 that has minimum Hamming dis-
tance 𝑈𝑈 . 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑() has a corresponding decoding function that can decode 𝐸𝐸  back 
to 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀. 
When decoding C, we can know the errors’ number and positions if the error number 
is not beyond d−1
2
 and then we can correct ⌊𝑑𝑑−1
2
⌋ errors [18]. If there are too many 
errors, the decoding of 𝐸𝐸 will fail and output a wrong message. 
Before we define the key updating function 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(), we need to define a key recy-
cling function  𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(). 
Definition 3. 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑘𝑘′, where 𝑘𝑘 is the old key, 𝑘𝑘′ is the recycled key and 0 ≤|𝑘𝑘′|𝑙𝑙 ≤ |𝑘𝑘|𝑙𝑙, is a two-universal hash function. We can say 𝑘𝑘′ is ε-secure if for 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ∈{0,1}|𝑘𝑘′|𝑙𝑙  is an ideal key, 
𝛿𝛿(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙 ,𝑘𝑘′) ≤ 𝜀𝜀.  
7 Rec(k) is used to do the privacy amplification to make sure the security of the recy-
cled key. We can then define a key updating function 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘) based on 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘). 
Definition 4. A key updating function 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘) = 𝑘𝑘′||𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 ∈ {0,1}|𝑘𝑘|𝑙𝑙, where 𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛 is 
a fresh key picked up from 𝐾𝐾 used to extend the length of the output, is used to main-
tain the security of a key 𝑘𝑘 without shorting its length. We also define the key recy-
cling rate of 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘) as 𝑡𝑡 = |𝑘𝑘′|𝑙𝑙|𝑘𝑘|𝑙𝑙 . 
Now we are ready to run our QKR protocol. The steps of our protocol are described 
below: 
1. Alice’s classical part: Alice picks up a key: 𝐴𝐴 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝑛  from K. Then she computes 
the message authentication code  𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) ∈ {0, 1}𝑡𝑡 . Alice encodes 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀||𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸  into  𝐸𝐸 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑑𝑑(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀||𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸) ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝑛+𝑡𝑡+𝑠𝑠 . Alice picks up another 
key: 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝑛+𝑡𝑡+𝑠𝑠 from K and computes the cipher 𝑀𝑀 = 𝐸𝐸 ⊕ 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. 
2. Alice’s quantum part: Alice picks up a key: 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝑛+𝑡𝑡+𝑠𝑠 from K. And encodes 
M into qubits sequence 𝑄𝑄 in the z-basis {|0⟩, |1⟩} or the x-basis �|+⟩ = 1/√2(|0⟩ +|1⟩), |−⟩ = 1/√2(|0⟩ − |1⟩)� according to 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. Then she sends 𝑄𝑄 to Bob. After this, 
Alice recycles 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 and 𝐴𝐴. 
3. Bob’s quantum part: When Bob receives 𝑄𝑄′, he picks up keys 𝐴𝐴,𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 , 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 from 𝐾𝐾 and 
measures 𝑄𝑄′ according to 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 and gets the cipher 𝑀𝑀’ = 𝐸𝐸’ ⊕𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣.  
4. Bob’s classical part: Bob computes the plaintext 𝐸𝐸’ = 𝑀𝑀’ ⊕𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. Then he decodes 
𝐸𝐸’ to correct potential errors and gets 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′||𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸′, the errors’ number 𝑞𝑞 is record-
ed. Then, Bob computes 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀′)  and checks  𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 ≟  𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸′ . Bob 
updates 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 to 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′ = 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣) according to 𝑞𝑞 and recycles 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 and 𝐴𝐴. 
5. In the next time Bob sends a message to Alice, he will tell Alice 𝑞𝑞 to let Alice up-
date 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 to 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′ . 
4 Security Analysis 
In this section, we will analyze the security of the message  𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 and the recy-
cled/updated keys 𝐴𝐴,𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′  and 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 . These analyses assume the adversary Eve, who wants 
to get 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 or keys, has full control of the quantum channel between Alice and Bob. 
Eve also has unlimited computation power and any other resources expect she needs 
to follow the laws of physics. We will analyze the security under the collective attacks 
[19] but assume the implementation of the protocol is ideal so Eve cannot use the 
hacking attacks [20] to get information. When we analyze the security of the recycled 
keys, we also assume that Eve can do the known-plaintext attack. Since Eve does not 
know about 𝐴𝐴, she is unable to get 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 in real scenarios. We still assume that Eve 
can get the whole plaintext (which contains 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 ) in the analyses of the recy-
cled/updated keys 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 and 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′ . 
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4.1 The security of the message 𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 
The security of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is obvious. After Alice’s classical part, the code 𝐸𝐸, which con-
tains the information of 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, is protected by the XOR encryption using 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. As long 
as 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 is secure, the cipher 𝑀𝑀 = 𝐸𝐸⊕ 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 has unconditional security and perfect privacy 
[21]. 
4.2 The security of the recycled 𝒖𝒖  
We first introduce a new hash function called ε-almost strong universal2  (ε-ASU2) 
hash function [22]. It is a family of hash functions 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) = 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 for 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 ∈{0,1}𝑡𝑡  that if u is a random key and for all 𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  that 𝑚𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚𝑚2  and 
all 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸, Pr
𝑢𝑢
[𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚1) = 𝑡𝑡1 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚2) = 𝑡𝑡2] ≤ ε|𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀| , 
where |𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸| is the number of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸′s possible values and ε is a secure parameter. 
In our protocol, the 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 in the cipher 𝑀𝑀 is protected by 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. Then, 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸⊕ 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 is ε-ASU2 because when 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 are secret keys and for all 𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 that 𝑚𝑚1 ≠ 𝑚𝑚2 
and all 𝑡𝑡1, 𝑡𝑡2 ∈ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸, Pr
𝑢𝑢,𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣[𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚1) ⊕𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 = 𝑡𝑡1 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝐴𝐴,𝑚𝑚2) ⊕𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 = 𝑡𝑡2] ≤ ε|𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀| . 
Next theorem, derived from the result of earlier research [23], follows:  
Theorem 1. We can bound the mutual information of the recycled 𝐴𝐴 and Eve’s infor-
mation 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 after 𝑢𝑢 round of the protocol, for 1 ≤ 𝑢𝑢 ≤ |𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸| by 
𝐼𝐼(𝐴𝐴;𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼) ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀|𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸| − �1 − 𝑛𝑛|𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀|� 𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀(|𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸|− 𝑢𝑢) , 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼 is the information including 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀, 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸, and Bob’s respond (accept or re-
ject) from these 𝑢𝑢 rounds. 
Theorem 1 shows that the information of u will leak but the leakage is very small and 
the recycled 𝐴𝐴 is still ε-secure [23].  
 
4.3 The security of the recycled 𝒌𝒌𝒃𝒃  
Because our protocol always recycle 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏, Eve can just intercept every qubit sent from 
Alice and don’t worry to be detected. After her attack, Eve can also get Bob’s re-
sponse 𝑅𝑅, which telling Eve how many errors Bob detected. The analysis splits into 
two parts. First, we analyze the information leakage from the intercepted qubits. Sec-
ond, we analyze the leakage from Bob’s response. 
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When Eve intercepts all qubits sent from Alice, she cannot know the value of each 
qubit even she can do the known-plaintext attack because the values are protected by 
𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. Eve needs to distinguish the qubits in the z-basis from the qubits in the x-basis. 
The next Lemma shows Eve can’t get any information about 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 from the intercepted 
qubits. 
Lemma 1. Randomly giving Eve one qubit in one of the four states: |0⟩, |1⟩, |+⟩, |−⟩ 
without giving Eve any other information, Eve cannot know the basis of the qubit. 
Proof. We assume Eve can measure the qubit with any ancilla bits and use any meas-
urement operators. And we denote the qubit with the ancilla bits as |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩, for  i ∈{0, 1, +,−}, and measurement operators are {𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚}. Base on the postulates of quantum 
measurement [24], the probability of measurement outcome 𝑚𝑚  of the state |𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖⟩ is 
𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)𝑖𝑖 = �𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚† 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚�𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖�, where 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚†  is the conjugate transpose of 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 . By direct 
computation, for all 𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 and all corresponding 𝑚𝑚, 
𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)0 + 𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)1 = 𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)+ + 𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)− . 
When Eve gets the measurement outcome 𝑚𝑚, she cannot get any information about 
the basis of the qubit. □ 
Next, we analyze the information leakage from Bob’s response. After Bob receiv-
ing the qubits from Alice (or Eve), he uses ECC to detect and correct the potential 
errors and sends the result back to Alice in the next round of the protocol. The re-
sponse 𝑅𝑅 is an integer which 0 ≤ 𝑅𝑅 ≤ |𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏|𝑙𝑙. We assume Eve can know the response 
𝑅𝑅 and use it to get 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏. For example: Eve can measure a qubit in the z-basis, and then 
wait for the response by Bob. If Bob detects one error, Eve will know that her meas-
urement caused this error and that the basis of the qubit is not in the z-basis. 
According to the analysis above, the information leakage is only from Bob’ re-
sponse R. By the properties of mutual information [25] that the mutual information 
𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸′) will not increase more than the exchanging information between the partici-
pants and Eve, We can bound the increasing of 𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸′) by the Shannon entropy of 
𝑅𝑅. Next theorem gives the desired result. 
Theorem 2. We can bound 𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸′), where 𝐸𝐸′ is Eve’s information after this round 
of the protocol, by 
𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸′) ≤ 𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸) + 𝐻𝐻(𝑅𝑅) , 
where 𝐼𝐼(𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏;𝐸𝐸) is the mutual information of recycled 𝑘𝑘𝑏𝑏 and Eve’s information before 
this round of the protocol. 
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We can cover the information leakage from R  by slightly updating the Kb  using 
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(). The key recycling rate of 𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏) is bound by Equation (2) and is nearly 1 
when the length of the message is long enough. 
4.4 The security of the updated 𝒌𝒌𝒗𝒗′  
The security of 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′  is easy to achieve. For example, 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣) can just output nothing 
and 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣′  is a new fresh key picked from 𝐾𝐾. In this section, we focus on how many se-
cret keys can be recycled from the old 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣 at most, i.e., the optimal key recycling rate 
of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣). To calculate the key recycling rate of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣), we use the properties of 
privacy amplification and bound the key recycling rate by Equation (1). We describe 
the formula here again: 
𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴|𝐸𝐸) − 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) , 
where 𝑡𝑡 is the key recycling rate, 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 are 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 held by Alice and Bob respectively 
and 𝐸𝐸 is the quantum state held by Eve. [15] shows the information leakage from the 
error correction part is 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵). Since in our QKR protocol, Bob already knows 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣. 
They don’t need to synchronize the key after the protocol and will not leak any infor-
mation from the error correction part. The next theorem shows the effect of this dif-
ference. 
Theorem 3. We can get 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴|𝐵𝐵) = 0 because Alice and Bob already know 𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣. The 
key recycling rate of 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝(𝑘𝑘𝑣𝑣) is then only bounded by 
 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴|𝐸𝐸) .  (3) 
Now we can calculate the key recycling rate of Udp(kv). We denote the joint system 
held by Alice, Bob and Eve after Eve’s attack by  |𝜓𝜓⟩𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ≔ ∑ �λ𝑖𝑖|Φ𝑖𝑖⟩𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 ⊗ |v𝑖𝑖⟩𝐴𝐴 4𝑖𝑖=1 , 
where |Φ1⟩𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 , … , |Φ4⟩𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 denote four Bell states in Alice and Bob’s joint system and |v1⟩𝐴𝐴 , … , |v4⟩𝐴𝐴 are some mutually orthogonal states held by Eve. Depending on Alice 
and Bob’s measurement results (with respect to the z-basis), we can denote Eve’s 
system by |𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖,𝑏𝑏⟩, where 𝑢𝑢, 𝑏𝑏 are Alice and Bob’s measurement results, |𝜃𝜃0,0⟩ = 1
√2 (�λ1|v1⟩𝐴𝐴⟩ + �λ2|v2⟩𝐴𝐴⟩) |𝜃𝜃0,1⟩ = 1
√2 (�λ1|v1⟩𝐴𝐴⟩ − �λ2|v2⟩𝐴𝐴⟩) |𝜃𝜃1,0⟩ = 1
√2 (�λ3|v3⟩𝐴𝐴⟩+ �λ4|v4⟩𝐴𝐴⟩) 
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|𝜃𝜃1,1⟩ = 1
√2
(�λ3|v3⟩𝐴𝐴⟩ − �λ4|v4⟩𝐴𝐴⟩) . 
We can write the density operator of Eve’s state according to Alice’s measurement 
results with respect to the basis {|v1⟩𝐴𝐴 , … , |v4⟩𝐴𝐴}, 
σ𝐴𝐴
𝑖𝑖 =
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡ λ1 ±�λ1λ2 0 0±�λ1λ2 λ2 0 00 0 λ3 ±�λ3λ40 0 ±�λ3λ4 λ4 ⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤ , 
where ± is a plus sign if 𝑢𝑢 = 0 and a minus sign if 𝑢𝑢 = 1. Now we are ready to calcu-
late Equation (1). Using the fact that 𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸) = 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴) + 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸|𝐴𝐴), we can get 
𝑆𝑆(𝐴𝐴|𝐸𝐸) = 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸|𝐴𝐴) + 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴) − 𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸) 
with S(𝐸𝐸|𝐴𝐴) = 1
2
𝑆𝑆(σ𝐴𝐴0) + 12 𝑆𝑆(σ𝐴𝐴1 ) , 
𝑆𝑆(𝐸𝐸) =  𝑆𝑆(σ𝐴𝐴0 + σ𝐴𝐴1 ) , 
and 𝐻𝐻(𝐴𝐴) = 1. Our protocol uses two encodings: the z-basis and the x-basis. Bob can 
know the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) for both encodings by the ECC. This gives 
two conditions on the state held by Alice and Bob. If we use the Bell basis to express 
these conditions, and if the QBER equals 𝑄𝑄 for both encodings, we can get λ3 + λ4 =
𝑄𝑄 and λ2 + λ4 = 𝑄𝑄, where λ1, … , λ4 are the diagonal entries of Alice and Bob’s states 
(with respect to the Bell basis). A straightforward calculation shows when λ4 = 𝑄𝑄2, 
the key recycling rate takes its minimum. We show the result in Fig. 1. 
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Fig. 1. The x-axis denotes the real QBER and the y-axis denotes the key recycling rate of 
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑈𝑈(𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣). 
The key recycling rate shows in Fig. 1 is the rate when the authentication check is 
successful. If the authentication check fails, the key recycling rate is just 0. This is 
because in our protocol, we use the ECC and 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸 to get the quantum bit error rate 
(QBER) instead of using the classical authentication channel to do the public discus-
sion. When the authentication check succeeds, Bob has a 1 − ε chance to consider the 
message is from Alice and is not disturbed by Definition 1. We can then consider the 
errors that were corrected by the ECC from 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣. We can know how many errors there 
are when the number of errors is not higher than �𝑑𝑑−1
2
� by the ECC. When the error 
number is higher than �𝑑𝑑−1
2
�, the decoding will fail and output a wrong message, and 
the authentication check will fail, too. If the authentication check fails, we need to set 
the QBER to 50% to cover the worst case because the ECC cannot output the right 
message and the QBER.  
It is obvious that our QKR protocol is more efficient than an OTP, which cannot 
recycle any used keys. Our QKR protocol can recycle part of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 and almost all other 
keys. When the QBER is 50%, we can consider the whole quantum message is inter-
cepted by Eve and replaced by a random quantum sequence, and this is the worst 
situation. Even we need to abandon the entire 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 in this worst case, the amount of 
keys we spend to send a message is equal to the OTP. 
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5 Conclusion and open questions 
In this paper, we found a security loophole in the existing studies of QKR protocol [1, 
2, 4, 26] for tolerating the noise of the quantum channel. We propose a new QKR 
protocol without this security loophole, and we also optimize the key recycling rate 
depending on the QBER. By delaying recycling some of the keys, the participants do 
not need any classical authentication channel in the proposed QKR protocol. Finally, 
the universal composable of the recycled key is proved by using the information theo-
ry.  
In this study, our analysis is under the condition that there is an optimal ECC and 
the length of transmission messages is infinite. However, the analysis with finite re-
sources can help us understand the potential of the QKR protocols in the practical 
situation. Therefore, how to analyze the security of our QKR protocol with finite re-
sources [27, 28] will be our future work. Additionally, the core idea that uses the error 
rate to optimize the key recycling rate in our research may also be used to improve the 
key recycling rate of quantum authentication protocol [29], which can only recycle 
the used keys when the quantum channel is noiseless. However, the security proof 
stated in this paper cannot be directly used in the quantum authentication protocol. 
The complete and suitable security analyses for key recycling rate optimization in 
quantum authentication protocol are also important future work.  
Appendix A: compare our QKR protocol to BB84 
In this section, we give an interesting result of our QKR protocol. It shows that the 
QKR protocol is not only a study about the potential of recycling keys, but also a 
useful protocol. 
A QKR protocol can also be used to share keys (just like a QKD protocol) because 
a random number that can be used as a key is also a kind of message. Since our QKR 
protocol can run in a noisy quantum channel, we can calculate the “key rate” of our 
QKR protocol and thus can compare our QKR protocol to the regular QKD protocols 
like BB84. We found our QKR protocol can share keys more efficiently (with a high-
er key rate) than the BB84 protocol in some situations.  
According to the Fig.1, the key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 is much better than the key rate 
of the BB84 protocol which the key rate will be 0 when the QBER is merely 11%. 
But it doesn’t directly imply our QKR protocol can share keys more efficiently than 
QKD protocols. When the error-tolerable of our protocol increases, the length of the 
message and thus the keys used to encrypt it also increase and we will consume more 
key at the same key recycling rate. In addition, we need to abandon lots of keys if the 
QBER is higher than the error-tolerable. 
Our QKR protocol can be seen as a QKD protocol if the message 𝑀𝑀 is a random 
number which can be used to be a new key. We call the keys 𝐴𝐴,𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 ,𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 used to run our 
QKR protocol the old keys and define the “key rate” 𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 of our QKR protocol as  
𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡 ≈
|𝑀𝑀|𝑙𝑙−(|𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠|𝑙𝑙−|𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠|𝑙𝑙)|𝑀𝑀|𝑙𝑙  , 
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where we omit the length of 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐸𝐸. The meaning of the key rate here is how many 
percents of the message (random number) can be used as a new key. Unlike the QKD 
protocol like BB84 which needs to do privacy amplification to make sure the security 
of the new key. In our QKR protocol, if the authentication check succeeds, the entire 
message is secure and can be used as a new key, but we might need to consume some 
old keys. According to the secure analysis in the last section, most of the consumed 
keys are 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣  and we can omit the consumption of 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏  if the message is long 
enough.  
To calculate the key rate of our QKR protocol, we need to know the length of bina-
ry linear code 𝐸𝐸 which encoding from the message 𝑀𝑀 by the error correction function. 
The longer the length of 𝐸𝐸 is, the more error-tolerable the code has. But we need to 
use more 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 to encrypt 𝐸𝐸. For the sake of convenience, the additional bits added by 
the ECC will be referred to as “the syndrome” in the following passages. Since the 
syndrome can fix the errors of the received message 𝑀𝑀′ held by Bob, the amount of 
useful information contained in the syndrome is equal to the uncertainty of Alice’s 
message 𝑀𝑀 conditioned on Bob’s message 𝑀𝑀′, which is according to the QBER 𝑄𝑄 and 
can be bound by the Shannon entropy 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄). The length of the syndrome is at least 
equivalent to 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄) because one bit message can carry at most one bit information. If 
an optimal ECC is applied, the length of 𝐸𝐸 which Alice sends to Bob via a quantum 
channel in our QKR protocol can be denoted by 
 |𝐸𝐸|𝑙𝑙 = �1 + 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄)1−𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄)� |𝑀𝑀|𝑙𝑙 (4) 
because the syndrome is also a part of the message and needs to correct itself. 
Now we are ready to calculate the key rate of our QKR protocol. Unlike the QKD 
protocol that estimates the QBER after the quantum part of the protocol by the public 
discussion, our QKR protocol needs to predict the QBER before the quantum part of 
the protocol and decides how many error-tolerable we need. For this reason, the key 
rate of our QKR protocol is not only according to the real QBER but also our predic-
tion. If the prediction QBER is less than the real one, our QKR protocol will fail and 
lose lots of keys. On the other hand, if the prediction QBER is more than the real one, 
we have to waste some keys to protect the useless part of the syndrome and thus de-
crease the key rate. When the prediction is perfect, we can get the best key rate at that 
QBER. The result of the calculation of the key rate of our QKR protocol shows in Fig 
2.  
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Fig. 2. The x-axis denotes the real QBER and the y-axis denotes the key rate. The line error-
tolerable 0.07 shows the key rate of our QKR protocol with the prediction QBER 0.07 accord-
ing to the real QBER. When the real QBER is 0.07, this is the best key rate out of all prediction 
QBERs for our QKR protocol. The line error-tolerable optimal shows the best key rate we can 
achieve according to the real QBER. And the line BB84 shows the key rate of the BB84 proto-
col according to the QBER. 
In our QKR protocol, the key 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 used to protect the syndrome can partially recycle 
and thus is more efficient than the BB84 protocol which leaks all information con-
tained in the syndrome. But the length of the syndrome used in our QKR protocol is 
longer than the syndrome used in the BB84 protocol because the BB84 protocol uses 
a classical authentication channel to send the syndrome and thus the syndrome 
doesn’t need to correct itself. The high key rate in our QKR protocol is achieved at 
the cost of low error-tolerable and high cost of the keys derived from situations where 
the real QBER is higher than the prediction. It worth mentioning that when the predic-
tion QBER is 0.11, the key rate of our QKR protocol is just equal to the key rate of 
BB84 and thus has no benefit. This shows that our QKR protocol is a viable option. 
When the noise of the quantum channel is fixed and lower than 0.11, using our QKR 
protocol to share keys is more efficient. 
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